Medea killed her children to take away the smile from her husband's face, according to Euripides, an offence against nature and morality. What ifMedea had still been canying her two children, perhaps due to give birth within a week or so, and had done the same? If this would also have been morally reprehensible, would that be a judgment based on her motives or on her action? We argue that the act has multiple and holistic moral features and that, in fact, there is no absolute principle, such as the right of the fetus to life, which governs our moraljudgments aboutfetal-maternal conflicts. We suggest that they illustrate a pervasive feature of human moral discourse and can only be addressed by attending to a range of negotiable moral considerations which depend on particularfeatures of each situation.
Introduction
The issue of "fetal-maternal conflicts"' is debated in relation to both clinical practice and social or public policy. We will explore the debate about fetalmaternal conflicts through a series of scenarios, including the classical tale of Medea. We argue that a focus on rights fails to capture the essential features of the moral problem. We therefore suggest a wider focus that includes: the agent's reasons or motives for relevant actions; the significance of the life of the moral patient, and the rights of each of the moral participants, We will argue that these three moral aspects of fetal-maternal conflicts should be held in a reflective equilibrium2 and suggest how one might resolve situations of fetal-maternal conflict.
1) Medea
Medea by Euripides raises issues that are as poignant today as they were when the play was first performed in 431 BC.
Medea is a young princess who falls in love with the Greek hero, Jason, and because of that love betrays her own father, helps Jason to steal the
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Fetal-maternal conflict; abortion Golden Fleece and flees her homeland. They settle in Corinth and have two children. However, Jason scorns and abandons Medea in order to marry (for political motives) Glauce, the daughter of Creon, King of Corinth. Stateless and alone Medea wreaks a terrible revenge. To repay Jason for his betrayal and cold-hearted defection, the incensed Medea, having made a pact with Aegeus, King of Athens for safe refuge, poisons Glauce, Jason's newly-wed wife, and her father, Creon. Finally Medea kills her own children crying, "I who gave them life will kill them". 3 Medea's act is shocking and violent. We can, perhaps, imagine reasons which would mitigate her moral transgression; for instance she might have thought her children could share only shame and suffering as unwanted and embarrassing cast-offs of a powerful political figure. These do not seem to be part of Euripides's account, although her sense of dishonour and betrayal almost create sympathy for her as a woman who has given everything to help her husband. Despite this sympathy, the motive for the act and its intrinsic barbarity warrant our condemnation. Even if Medea is justified in her outrage, the destruction of her children as an act of revenge against Jason seems plainly to be wrong. Euripides himself recognises the injury to Medea, yet his moral assessment of her is harsh. The chorus sings:
"O miserable mother, to destroy your own increase, Murder Melissa is thirty weeks pregnant with twins and is abandoned by her partner, James, whom she has supported for several years while he has studied law. James leaves her to marry the daughter of a senior partner in a major law firm. Melissa, like Medea, is infuriated, and seeks revenge on James by ending her pregnancy.
3) Nada Nada, twenty-four weeks pregnant, has hypertension-of-pregnancy (HOP) syndrome. This is a life-threatening condition in which the pregnant woman's blood pressure rises to a dangerous level with a high risk of brain haemorrhage or seizures. The only way to protect Nada from these risks is to abort the fetus. Nada is deeply upset but as there is no alternative a termination is arranged.
4) Olga
Olga is twenty-two weeks pregnant. She has been fairly ambivalent about the pregnancy but has not sought an abortion, nor shown any aversion towards her fetus. However, she now begins to see the pregnancy as too great a burden and would prefer not to continue with it any more. She has the attitude of: "I'd rather not bother".
These four scenarios -Medea, Melissa, Nada and Olga -provoke a range of moral judgments which embrace multiple conflicting considerations. We will try to outline an analysis of such conflicts resting on three major features: (i) the reason for the act; (ii) the life of the moral patients; (iii) the rights of the moral participants. [Hoder] took the mistletoe and aimed at Baldr as directed by Loki. The dart went right through him and he fell dead to the ground. 7 Hoder cast the twig believing that Baldr was invulnerable to it but was blameless due to the innocuousness of his intentions (there is agent-evil here but it is in Loki, the instigator, or "killer by plan" rather than Hoder the "killer by hand".)
Arguably, a good act might come from vicious (i) we do not mourn the biologically commonplace failure of the fertilised ovum to implant in the uterus nor do we uniformly condemn "the morning after pill"; (ii) constraints are thought necessary on the treatment of human embryos, for instance in research.
We favour a gradualist account of the moral importance of the fetus which views gestation as a continuum, where the "human form"(in the Aristotelian sense) becomes more and more fully realised both developmentally and in terms of moral worth.9 On this account it is misleading to search for a single point in the development of the fetus when a line is crossed which changes its intrinsic moral value. Such lines are usually drawn to try and capture the presence or absence of some favoured human property, such as the possession of self-awareness'0 (which may well not occur until sometime after birth), viability,"I or sentience.'2 The gradualist view shares with these a conception that there are features of a human life which confer special moral value on it but does not ask for metaphysically and empirically problematic lines to be drawn.
We take the view, as argued by one of us elsewhere, that our moral judgments about creatures depend on the way we react or respond to them. 13 In outline, the thesis is that reciprocal, even if asymmetrical, responses and reactions to others create the awareness that others are beings to whom certain things matter in the same way that they do to oneself. This view implies that moral discourse arises within an interactional context as our actions become informed by the needs, intentions, and vulnerabilities of others. But how is the posited link (between moral discourse and relational aspects of human life) applied to the fetus? Where there is full reciprocity and a resultingly strong sensitivity to how things are with the other then we confer full moral equality on that other. But where the interaction is attenuated, so, to some extent, are our moral ascriptions. It follows that as our contact with another kind of being approximates our normal interaction with fully reciprocating beings we would ascribe greater moral weight to that being's life.
It has been argued that the fetus is not regarded as an individual in itself distinct from the pregnant woman.'4 Thus Gallagher claims that punishment for the destruction of a fetus can be viewed primarily in relation to the interests of the pregnant woman (ie to be protected from serious assault and the pain and loss suffered through losing a future child). '5 Other commentators espouse the opposing view that the fetus is an entity separate from the woman and, although contained within the pregnant woman's body, is only connected for the purposes of nutrition. Gallagher mentions the idea that fetuses are in "intrauterine exile" from the outside world or "children nestled within" the pregnant woman who can be seen as a "uterine capsule"'6 or "fetal container"'7. On this view women could (arguably) be submitted to risky or harmful procedures if there were a strong argument for safeguarding the rights of the fetus. 8 We argue, contra both extremes, that the fetus is part of the (Aristotelian) form of a human: "On this view, the process of becoming a person is a progression through a series of linked developmental stages. Because each stage is an essential component of the whole, the form of humanity involves a life with a characteristic longitudinal 'shape"'. 9 This view suggests a gradual increase in the moral value of the life of the patient from conception to birth, and allows modification of that value depending on the engagement between the fetus and others. Thus the real and potential engagement of a late fetus with our human community (an expected new member, a soon-to-arrive object of care and nurture) creates a moral value independent of the mother. And the more undeveloped the capacity for interaction is, the less weight ought to be put on the life of the fetus as moral patient. 20 This is clearly a kind of potentiality thesis in that the potential for the kind of interaction that characterises moral beings confers moral Moral arguments about rights, because of their focus on general claims, often neglect facts which alter our moral perception of a particular situation. Consider, for instance, Thomson' s famous case in which a woman, call her Pipa, is connected without her consent to the life-support system of a famous, kidney-diseased violinist. She is aware that a decision to unhook herself means death for him, but nevertheless claims a right not to be so imposed upon. 26 The case is important in that the dependent party is clearly a person, and yet Pipa's rights seem unassailable. However, the rights-based conclusion looks less secure if the person needing life-support through the kidney connection is an eight-year-old girl and the one who can save her is her father. 27 In the modified version it seems that, even if the father still has a right to refuse, he also has a conflicting duty to his daughter. 28 The modified Thomson case suggests that the moral force of rights-talk is affected by relational facts. The case of Medea also shows how heavily our judgments in this area are loaded with relational and other norms. This feature of moral judgements has marked all three of the factors we have picked out: (i) the relevant reasons for action characteristically involve the effects of our actions on, and our relationships to, others; (ii) the lives of moral patients reflect their actual and potential capacities for meaningful relationships; and (iii) the rights that can be exercised in any situation are sensitive to relational features of that situation. Jason reprimands Medea for the crimes she committed partly for his sake and regards her as having obtained status by marrying him. But Medea may have acted to reclaim her personhood, or to exercise the only power she had in a situation where she, her family, and her people had been dishonoured. She may also have had an interest in saving her children from a vicious life with a weak father and a suspect step-family who would perhaps not have their best interests at heart. These reasons for Medea's action tend towards virtue, but other features of her terrible act seem to outweigh any possible justifications.
The lives of her victims are of value in themselves and, even if Creon and his daughter might "deserve to die" (in terms of ancient Greek conceptions of desert), her children are innocent and have equal moral status to other persons)."3 Medea as a mother surely has certain rights not to be estranged from her children if she goes into exile leaving them behind. However, the fact that she is their mother suggests that none of her possible motives justifies her killing them. The parental relationship also suggests that we should recognise Jason's responsibility in the tragedy.
Euripides's opinion is that Medea must be mad or possessed by some demon. We agree that her action is vicious and in such profound conflict with fundamental features of human relatedness and caring that her rights and defensible reasons are insufficient to justify her. That judgment combines, in a reflective equilibrium, our intuitions and the morally significant features arrived at in the preceding analysis.3' But how does this approach fare in our other cases? MELISSA Melissa has similar motives to Medea, but her fetuses are not yet born. Therefore, even though her reasons are the same as those of Medea (she also wants to harm her faithless partner at the cost of two human lives) her act is morally different. The status of her victims, the fetal twins, is more uncertain, legally and morally, than that of born children. The gradualist view grants considerable moral weight to fetuses of this age, in accordance with the position that seems to be developing in US law. Several US cases in which there appears to be a conflict between the interests of the pregnant woman and the interests of her fetus, have been resolved in favour of the fetus or a child-tobe. These decisions place considerable weight on the similarity between the well-developed fetus and a child. However, similarity is not identity and that difference gives more space to our other considerations.
Melissa, if her choice is denied, suffers an even greater infringement of her rights than Medea.
Melissa would have to carry her fetuses for another six to ten weeks and then go through a difficult labour and birth. Her fetuses therefore intrude significantly into her life. However, the fetuses are quite viable apart from her if adequate neonatal care is available so we must ask to what extent she should have the right to determine their fate.
A parent's rights rest on the fact that she/he has the best interests of her/his (born) child at heart -but this is not true of Melissa. However, it seems unfair to deprive her of any say in the lives of her fetuses in that she has an unenviable choice between having to raise her children by herself or being estranged from them and knowing that they are being parented by others. But even if she has some rights, neither her rights nor her reasons seem sufficient to justify ending two human lives.
NADA
What of Nada, twenty-four weeks pregnant with severe HOP syndrome? Nada's case seems morally unassailable: either Nada lives and the fetus is sacrificed or Nada dies, most probably also ending the life of her fetus. No "we are convinced that such an ethical obligation exists and that women should behave accordingly.... Nevertheless, it is quite another matter to transform this ethical obligation into a legal duty by enforcing it with the coercive power of the law."
Our actions towards fetuses can have sources which are less virtuous than a commitment to respect a woman's bodily integrity, privacy, and self-control. These include such things as the desire for revenge, jealousy, the wish to do clever medical procedures, or an attitude that women are fetal containers. Any of these would modify our moral attitudes towards the exercise of what we might otherwise regard as soundly based rights. Some commentators suggest that we should always err on the side of the pregnant woman but this seems wrong where the lives of the moral patients are a major factor in the decision.36 However, a stress on women's rights is almost certainly an important safeguard which ensures the non-subordination of women. These rights must count for a great deal in any situation where our reasons for intervention on the fetus are suspect (on medical or moral grounds) or where the fetus itself is affected in some way that alters the moral nature of life-preserving treatment (for instance it might have a poor prognosis in terms of perinatal mortality).3 Also, as in Nada's case where the pregnant woman's life was in danger, the moral scales should clearly be weighted in her favour.
Conclusion
We have argued that the problem of fetal-maternal conflict reflects the inherent holism and multiplicity of moral thought and cannot be resolved by appeal to any unitary principle. For instance, a method based solely on rights cannot do justice to complexities involving the moral relevance of the life of the fetus, the reasons, life choices and rights of the pregnant woman, and the way in which these impinge on each other. Our analysis embraces the inseparability of individuals and their interwoven lives. It is only within such a framework that we can achieve the kind of reflective equilibrium that does justice to what "in social and personal life counts as something".38
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